

001-149-83/1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

82-0050/A

19 JAN 1982

The Honorable Eugene V. Rostow
 Director
 United States Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 Washington, DC 20451

Dear Gene:

Thank you for sending Dr. Churba's memorandum. I have passed it to the appropriate Office in our Directorate of Intelligence for review. We also have been concerned that developments in the Middle East could lead to a scenario along the lines suggested by Dr. Churba. I appreciate your effort in informing me of the thinking of your people on this subject.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

William J. Casey
 Director of Central Intelligence

State Dept. review completed

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
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Executive Secretary
8 January 1982

Date

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

January 7, 1982

Dear Bill,

I enclose a memorandum from Dr. Churba of our Strategic Assessments Office. He is an experienced and reliable observer of Arab-Israeli affairs.

Yours sincerely,

EVR
Eugene V. Rostow

Enclosure:

Dr. Churba's report

The Honorable
William J. Casey, Director
Central Intelligence Agency

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

January 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Joseph Churba *JC*

SUBJECT: A Likely Israeli Initiative

Efforts by official Washington and Jerusalem to restore calm notwithstanding -- the current shift in US-Israel relations is most likely the prelude to an Israeli military initiative designed to redraw the political map in Lebanon. Its purpose would be to improve Israel's security position vis-a-vis Syria and the PLO in the period of time left before the final withdrawal from Sinai (25 April) as provided by the peace treaty with Egypt. The Golan affair may therefore be the opening gambit for acquiring the necessary freedom of action to offset the loss of the Sinai security belt in circumstances where American policy is perceived as fundamentally inimical to Israel's security. By terminating policy coordination with Washington, Prime Minister Begin again acquires the necessary flexibility he earlier used to launch his peace initiative with Egypt -- after the abortive joint US-USSR communique of October 1977. Where that initiative led to the Camp David accords, Begin's present action is aimed at securing his northern flank against Syria irrespective of Egypt's long-term intentions. He no doubt believes that evacuation from Sinai will be followed by concerted Arab (Egypt included) and European pressures with American collaboration to squeeze Israel into the 1949 armistice lines. His intention is to preserve the peace with Egypt but also to reduce the vulnerabilities arising therefrom by destroying the PLO/Syrian position in Lebanon and expanding the northern buffer.

Destruction of the PLO cannot be achieved without altering the political map in Lebanon. A repeat of the earlier Litani operation is ruled out and in any case Israel does not intend to pay twice for the objective only to surrender it under US pressure. Its intention must be nothing less than delivering a knock-out blow against the

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PLO and removing Lebanon as a confrontation state or staging area. If so, the Israelis must sweep through the UNIFIL zone beyond the Litani, eliminate the 15,000 PLO force and link the two areas under Lebanese Christian control. In effect, Lebanon will be partitioned.

Israel most certainly believes that the issue of a wider war with Syria would be determined by Moscow since the Soviets control the Syrian army down to the battalion level. With Moscow engaged in Afghanistan and Poland, the assumption is that a wider war can be averted. As against this risk, they also estimate that the operation can be completed within two days of good weather.